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Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. famously stated that the “arc of the
moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”1 When it comes
to justice for atrocity crimes, the shape and length of that arc varies
significantly by situation and is impacted by a number of factors.
On one end of the spectrum might be the Nuremberg Trials (and
similarly, the Control Council Law Number 10 hearings, and the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East as relates to Japan),
where there was a relatively tight parabola between Nazi atrocities
and prosecutions. On the other end are events that occurred long
ago (and may be ongoing) for which there is yet to be meaningful
accountability; think North Korea and the extensive evidence of
crimes against humanity there, without any accountability as of

* J. Andrew Boyle, former prosecutor at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia. The Author thanks his family for their support, and expresses his gratitude to
the editorial staff of the Fordham International Law Journal for their editing work.
1. See, e.g., Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech in Montgomery, Alabama: Our God is
Marching On! (Mar. 25, 1965). This quote was itself a paraphrase of a refrain by Unitarian
minister and abolitionist Theodore Parker. See All Things Considered: Theodor Parker and
the
‘Moral
Universe’,
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Sept.
2,
2010),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129609461
[https://perma.cc/M9LP-RCAQ].
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yet.2 Along this continuum fall other situations, whose position
might conceptually take into account not only how long in raw time
some measure of accountability takes, but also the robustness of
that accountability process.
In regards to atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge,3 the
path to justice for one perpetrator recently came to an abrupt end
with the death of Nuon Chea, the most senior Khmer Rouge leader
put on trial at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”) in August 2019.4 For those encountering this
fact for the first time, it can be surprising that forty years after the
invasion that toppled the Khmer Rouge, the justice process had not
yet concluded. Nuon Chea died after conviction at trial for crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, but before the appeals
process in that case—the second against him¾could be
completed. This not only disappointed victims and stakeholders,
but also raised interesting legal questions that the court had to
resolve regarding the status of the trial convictions.
Many factors contributed to this elongated timeline for justice
in regards to Nuon Chea and other Khmer Rouge perpetrators that
fall within the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC.5 On the
hypothetical spectrum the Author raised above, the ECCC’s
proceedings are certainly farther along the temporal gap between
the commission of atrocities and transitional justice measures
assigning criminal responsibility for them than the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). After all, in regards to the
2. Although there has not been accountability, there has been documentation of the
atrocities by organizations including the United Nations. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Council, Rep.
of the Comm’n of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (2014).
3. Here, the Author uses the colloquial term “Khmer Rouge” to refer to the entity that
governed Democratic Kampuchea. That term was coined by the late Cambodian King
Norodom Sihanouk, and was not used by the members of the organization themselves.
4. Saloth Sar, a.k.a. Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, passed away before he
could be detained by the tribunal. See Seth Mydans, Death of Pol Pot; Pol Pot, Brutal Dictator
who Forced Cambodians to Killing Fields, Dies at 73, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1998, at A14.
5. The personal jurisdiction of the ECCC is limited to “senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of
Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international
conventions recognized by Cambodia.” Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the
Period of Democratic Kampuchea (with inclusion of amendments as promulgated on Oct.
27, 2004), art. 2, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Cambodia).
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atrocities that the ICTY and ICTR respectively addressed, the
relevant events occurred over a decade later than those
perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge, and the judicial mechanisms
have largely concluded.6
The story, briefly outlined here, of how trials against Khmer
Rouge perpetrators were not yet complete in 2019 is a cautionary
one about the need for states and the international community to
move as swiftly as possible to attain justice for atrocities. However,
the unsatisfying conclusion in regards to Nuon Chea occurs at a
time when international accountability mechanisms have made
new, creative strides towards shortening the justice arc, giving
hope that such occurrences will be fewer and farther between in
the future.7 Those who claim that the golden age for international
criminal justice is past, must also acknowledge the advantages of
these novel developments.
I. ACCOUNTING FOR FOUR DECADES
In August 2019, Nuon Chea (born Long Buntuoton), the
Deputy Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) and
second in command of the Khmer Rouge, died of natural causes at
the age of ninety-three.8 On his death, proceedings against him
regarding crimes committed under the Khmer Rouge had not
concluded at the joint tribunal established by the United Nations
and the Cambodian government, the ECCC. To understand why
justice took so long in this case, it is necessary to go back to 1979
when the Khmer Rouge was ousted after almost four years in
power by an invading Vietnamese army that was tired of
Democratic Kampuchea’s (as Cambodia was then known) cross6. Two cases emanating out of events in the former Yugoslavia continue under the
auspices of the International Residual Mechansim for Criminal Tribunals: Jovica Stanišić
and Franko Simatović, and Ratko Mladić. Of course, these tribunals were not without their
own deaths prior to proceedings could complete, perhaps most notably the death of
Slobodan Milošević. See Marlise Simons & Alison Smale, Slobodan Milosevic, 64, Former
Yugoslav Leader Accused of War Crimes, Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/europe/slobodan-milosevic-64-formeryugoslav-leader-accused-of-war.html [https://perma.cc/GK6J-NAZ4].
7. Full disclosure: The Author was a prosecutor at the Khmer Rouge Trials from
2011-2018, including in the cases concerning Nuon Chea.
8. Seth Mydans, Nuon Chea, Khmer Rouge’s Chief Ideologist, Dies at 93, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/12/world/europe/slobodan-milosevic64-former-yugoslav-leader-accused-of-war.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/4UXB-KNM8].
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border aggression. ECCC criminal investigations into atrocities
committed by the Khmer Rouge would not begin for over two
decades.9
Geo-politics would have ensured significant resistance to the
creation of a court to try Khmer Rouge suspects for the first dozen
or so years after their overthrow. China continued to support the
Khmer Rouge—which had fled to an area along the border of
northwest Cambodia and Thailand—as it had during the period of
Democratic Kampuchea. And the Cold War made strange
bedfellows of the United States and the Khmer Rouge, who were
united against the Vietnamese puppet government in Cambodia.10
As one example of this, the United States defended the Khmer
Rouge’s holding of the Cambodian seat at the UN over the new
government set up by Vietnam.11
Nonetheless, although geo-politics is often a major hindrance
to the establishment of international justice mechanisms, in this
instance, the delay in the early years had a deeper cause. The fact
is that after the courts and proceedings directly following World
War II, widespread support for international criminal courts to
deal with mass atrocities had been relatively dormant until the
early 1990s. Then, as the push for international justice began to
bear fruit alongside (and to an extent because of) the end of the
Cold War, and around the time events in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda led to the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, respectively,
Cambodia emerged from UN-sponsored elections in 1993.12 In
addition, Vietnam had withdrawn its forces from Cambodia, and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (“USSR”) had dissolved.
9. The Vietnamese did hold in absentia show trials, named the People’s
Revolutionary Tribunal, of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary shortly after they toppled the Khmer
Rouge.
10. In addition to the United States’ antagonistic history with Vietnam, Vietnam was
aligned with the USSR.
11. See Don Oberdorfer, U.S. to Support Pol Pot Regime for U.N. Seat, WASH. POST (Sept.
16,
1980),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/09/16/us-tosupport-pol-pot-regime-for-un-seat/58b8b124-7dd7-448f-b4f7-80231683ec57/
[https://perma.cc/P5AA-VPA9]. The United States also supported other Cambodian
political factions that wanted to regain power from the government that Vietnam had
helped set up, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. That government contained many
former Khmer Rouge members who had fled to Vietnam to avoid the internal purges
carried out by the Communist Party of Kampuchea, including the man who currently
serves as Prime Minister, Hun Sen.
12. The Paris Peace Agreements of 1991 ended the civil war between the competing
factions and established the timeline for the elections.
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Fraught negotiations between international stakeholders and the
Cambodian government over establishing a court to try Khmer
Rouge crimes lasted from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, and the
ECCC was finally and fully established in 2004.13
II. CASE PROCEEDINGS AT THE ECCC
The prosecutors at the ECCC requested that five suspects,
including Nuon Chea, be investigated in 2007.14 Nuon Chea was
detained in September of that year,15 but his was not the first case
to proceed to trial.16 Instead, the ECCC first tried Kaing Guek Eav,
also known as Duch,17 a much lower level member of the Khmer
Rouge who oversaw the S-21 security center in Phnom Penh.
Starting with Duch’s trial had the benefit of allowing the new court
to ease into its work with a relatively straightforward case: there
was extensive evidence concerning S-21, the crime sites were
mostly focused on that one security center, and Duch was willing
to admit to—and provide information on—much of the functioning
of the Khmer Rouge and his own role in it.18 This meant that the
Duch case—named Case 001—also served as a useful evidentiary
and procedural base for the more complex case that was to come
next.

13. Instrument of Ratification on the Agreement between the United Nations and the
Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of
Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (promulgated by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Int’l Cooperation, (Oct. 19, 2004)).
14. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Statement of the CoProsecutors (July 18, 2007). Later, in 2009, the International Co-Prosecutor alone would
request the investigation of an additional five suspects. Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, Statement of the Acting International Co-Prosecutor: Submission of
Two New Introductory Submissions (Sept. 8, 2009).
15. Police Charge Pol Pot Deputy with War Crimes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 19, 2007.
His Co-Defendants Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith, and Khieu Samphan were then arrested in
November.
16. The ECCC had only one staffed trial chamber, preventing concurrent trials.
17. For a fascinating description of how Duch was located, see generally Nic Dunlop,
THE LOST EXECUTIONER (2006).
18. Thierry Cruvalier, Opinion, The Khmer Rouge’s Perfect Villain, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8,
2012).
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/opinion/the-khmer-rouges-perfectvillain.html [https://perma.cc/7TGB-QD6V].
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The trial against Nuon Chea¾Case 002¾did not begin until
November 2011,19 after the Trial Chamber had released the
judgment in Case 001.20 Two main factors made Case 002
significantly more complex than Case 001. First, it concerned not
only Nuon Chea but also three other individuals who, while not
quite as senior as him, were among the inner circle of the Khmer
Rouge. They were: Khieu Samphan, President of the State
Presidium; Ieng Sary, Foreign Minister; and Ieng Thirith,21 Minister
of Social Affairs.22 Each of these individuals had their own defense
teams, and although much of the evidence would relate commonly
to all of the defendants, there was portions of evidence that was
primarily relevant only to some subset of the defendants. This
meant that the case was not as evidentially streamlined as it might
have been with fewer defendants. Moreover, in addition to each
defense team participating separately in court, it also meant that
proceedings had to account for their different roles in the Khmer
Rouge, and different defense strategies and requests, and contend
with separate briefs. Second, the crimes charged in Case 002 were
of a greater variety (each, of course, with their own elements to
prove, increasing the evidentiary burden), far more numerous, and
covered the entire country.23
An incident near the beginning of the Case 002 trial served to
highlight the significant amount of time that had already passed
since the Khmer Rouge was in power. Ieng Thirith developed
cognitive difficulties and was eventually diagnosed with dementia.
As her medical issues presented themselves, her case was severed
19. Cambodia Tribunal Monitor, Opening Statements in Case 002 l November 23, 2011
– Part 1, VIMEO (Nov. 23, 2011), https://vimeo.com/32520185 [https://perma.cc/JN8PCCL6].
20. Co-Prosecutors v. Kaing, Case File/Dossier No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC,
Judgement
(July
26,
2010),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/20100726_Judgemen
t_Case_001_ENG_PUBLIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD8G-HQ4N].
21. Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith were spouses. Sopheng Cheang, Ieng Thirith, a Leader
of Cambodia’s Brutal Khmer Rouge Regime, Dies at 83, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ieng-thirith-a-leader-of-cambodias-brutalkhmer-rouge-regime-dies-at-83/2015/08/22/a2a2c7b4-48dc-11e5-846d02792f854297_story.html [https://perma.cc/DH8D-LESD].
22. Id. The power and responsibility of the defendants often had much more to do
with their positions within the Communist Party of Kampuchea than with their formal
titles.
23. See generally Case 002: Closing Order, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, Sept. 15, 2010.
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from the rest of the defendants so that the resolution of those
issues would not delay the case moving forward.24 Eventually, Ieng
Thirith’s medical condition would prove to be so severe that she
could not participate in her own defense, and therefore could not
be tried.25
Shortly after the trial in Case 002 began, the Trial Chamber
decided to break the case into multiple smaller trials, each of which
would be shorter than attempting to try all of the crimes in the
indictment in one case.26 This would address two looming
concerns. First, as Ieng Thirith’s dementia drove home, the
defendants were not getting any younger. As the trial started in
November 2011, Ieng Sary was eighty-six, Nuon Chea was eightyfive, and Khieu Samphan was eighty.27 This was in a country where
average male life expectancy even today is only seventy years.28
One or more smaller trials would increase the possibility that
proceedings on at least some charges would reach a conclusion
before the defendants passed away or were rendered un-triable.
Unfortunately, this would prove to be too little too late in the case
of Ieng Sary, who died in March 2013, midway through the first
trial.29
Second, breaking the case up into smaller trials helped
alleviate the possibility that funding for the court would run out
before a larger trial and appeal could conclude. The ECCC was
24. Seth Mydans, U.N. Court in Cambodia Recommends Freeing Defendant Ill with
Dementia,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
17,
2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/world/asia/sickly-defendant-khmer-rougegenocide-trial-in-cambodia-may-be-freed.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/GZT2-XSED].
25. Ieng Thirith eventually passed away in August 2015. Thomas Fuller, Ieng Thirith,
Khmer Rouge Minister in Cambodia, Dies at 83, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/world/asia/ieng-thirith-khmer-rougeminister-in-cambodia-dies-at-83.html?searchResultPosition=4 [https://perma.cc/H6DGQYHE].
26. Case 002: Severance Order Pursuant to Internal Rule 89ter, Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Sept. 22, 2011.
27. See Case 002: Closing Order, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
Sept. 15, 2010, pp. 391, 392, & 394.
28. See The World Bank, Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (Years) – Cambodia,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=KH
[https://perma.cc/C3GY-PPS8] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
29. Seth Mydans, Ieng Sary, Former Official of Khmer Rouge, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/15/world/asia/ieng-sary-khmerrouge-leader-tied-to-genocide-dies-at-87.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/W4FG-BD4J].
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funded jointly by the Cambodian government, which often fell
short in making payments, and voluntary donations of supportive
governments.30 The voluntary donation process, rather than
allotments from the general UN budget, made funds precarious and
planning difficult.31 Having a shorter timeline for judgments made
it more likely that funds would suffice through the end of a case.
However, what crimes would be included in the first trial, and
what therefore left to possible future trials (or not addressed
should no future trials occur), was the subject of significant
dispute. The Trial Chamber initially made the decision of what
crimes would be included unilaterally, without input from the
parties.32 The prosecution, and eventually other parties,
challenged that initial decision on the basis that the included
crimes were not sufficiently representative in terms of the range
and severity of crimes, of the entirety of the indictment. 33At the
time, there was a very real sense that although the possibility was
left open for future trials that would include other crimes, there
might be only one trial because of the aforementioned age and
financial issues. Should Case 2/1 end up being the only trial that
was completed against these defendants, the thinking went, it is
important that it includes a representative sample of all of the
crimes contained in the indictment. The Supreme Court Chamber
ultimately agreed with this view, but by the time the litigation on
the matter had concluded (including two sets of appeals from Trial
Chamber severance orders), it ruled that although the crimes
included in the first trial were not representative, issues of
practicality dictated that the first trial should be completed as soon
as possible in its extant form. It further held that the Trial Chamber
30. A shift in the funding structure in later years allowed for an allotment of funds
from the UN general budget directly to make up funding shortfalls.
31. See e.g., Samean Yun, Budget Woes Trim Hearings, REFWORLD, (Oct. 23, 2012),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5090e57c19.html
[https://perma.cc/6684-B398];
Erika Kinetz, Cambodian Side of ECCC Short of Funds: Auditor, CAMBODIA DAILY (Dec. 21,
2007),
https://english.cambodiadaily.com/news/cambodian-side-of-eccc-short-offunds-auditor-61714/ [https://perma.cc/Y8X2-YAYQ].
32. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCCITC,
Severance Order Pursuant to Internal Rule 89ter (Sept. 22, 2011),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/E124_EN.PDF
[https://perma.cc/6AYV-QWXZ].
33. See Case 002: Decision on the Co-Prosecutors’ Immediate Appeal of the Trial
Chamber’s Decision Concerning the Scope of Case 002/01, Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia, Feb. 8, 2013.
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must then move as expeditiously as possible to the second trial,
which should exhibit the requisite representativeness.34
The events and crimes ultimately included in Case 2/1, as it
was then named, were set at crimes against humanity connected to
a series of forced population movements in the earlier part of the
Khmer Rouge regime, and a mass execution of former Khmer
Republic (as the government immediately preceding the Khmer
Rouge was known) members of the military.35 Nuon Chea and
Khieu Samphan were convicted at trial in Case 2/1 of various
crimes against humanity in August 2014,36 and most of those
convictions, as well as the life sentences imposed for them, were
confirmed on appeal in November 2016.37 Nevertheless, the
defendants had yet to be tried for the majority of the crimes for
which they had been indicted, including genocide and war crimes.
Moreover, they remained in relatively good health, and funding for
the court continued to be available, making a second trial possible.
III. AN INCONVENIENT DEATH
In October 2014, after the Trial Chamber issued its judgment
in case 2/1, and while appeals were ongoing, the case 2/2 trial
34. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCCTC/SC(28), Decision on Immediate Appeals against Trial Chamber’s Second Decision on
Severance
of
Case
002:
Summary
of
Reasons
(July
23,
2013),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2013-0723%2016%3A57/E284_4_7_EN.PDF [https://perma.cc/C3GY-PPS8]; see also CoProsecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-TC/SC(18), Decision on
the Co-Prosecutors’ Immediate Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision Concerning the
Scope
of
Case
002/01
(Feb.
8,
2013),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2013-0211%2018%3A23/E163_5_1_13_EN-1.PDF [https://perma.cc/SLJ6-US7Y].
35. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-TC/SC,
Decision on Severance of Case 002 Following Supreme Court Chamber Decision of Feb. 8,
2013
(Apr.
26,
2013),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2013-0426%2016%3A43/E284_EN.PDF [https://perma.cc/N6N7-X97S].
36. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-TC/SC,
Case
002/01
Judgement
(Aug.
7,
2014),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2014-0807%2017%3A04/E313_Trial%20Chamber%20Judgement%20Case%20002_01_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4W9-PB44].
37. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/SC,
Appeal
Judgement
(Nov.
23,
2016),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/%5Bdate-intz%5D/F36_EN_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2P4T-7RVE].
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began.38 Relative to Case 2/1, the crimes included in 2/2 were far
wider-ranging in terms of the type of crimes (which included for
the first time charges such as genocide, and that addressed the
practice of forced marriage, and marital rape), the chronological
period (which covered the entirety of the Khmer Rouge period in
power), and the geographic range (which included crime sites
across the country).39 This set of crimes captured to a far greater
degree the fullness of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities.
The trial judgment in Case 2/2 was issued in March 2019,
convicting Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan of crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide of the Vietnamese.40 It further
convicted Nuon Chea alone of genocide against the Cham, a Muslim
minority.41 On sentencing the defendants to life imprisonment,42
the Trial Chamber found Nuon Chea’s involvement in the crimes to
be “pivotal, extensive, and significant.”43 Nuon Chea filed a notice
of his intention to appeal on various grounds but then died.44
Nuon Chea’s death at the interstitial moment between trial
judgment and appeal judgment raised a question: what happens to
convictions at trial when the defendant dies before an appeal is
concluded? Put another way, should a trial judgment where the
convicted person does not have the opportunity to appeal remain
38. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002-02/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC
Transcript of Proceedings, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, (Oct. 17,
2014),
available
at:
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2014-1024%2015%3A11/E1_242.1_TR002_20141017_Final_EN_Pub.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5J3W-2HV4].
39. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC,
Decision on Additional Severance of Case 002 and Scope of Case 002/02 (Apr. 4, 2014),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/2014-0407%2016%3A12/E301_9_1_EN-optimized.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPL9-NKLA]. Not all
crimes in the original indictment were included in Case 2/1 and 2/2 combined, however
the Trial Chamber ruled that those that were not would be dismissed.
40. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Case
002/02
Judgement
(Mar.
27,
2019),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LA9ttO7C4fgC1aSb1cAoe9ofzwDuERx5/view?ts=5c9c9bb
0 [https://perma.cc/F75G-B9GL].
41. Id.
42. Id. This life sentence was merged with the life sentence imposed in Case 002/1.
43. Id., para. 2192.
44. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Nuon
Chea’s Notice of Appeal Against the Trial Judgement in Case 002/02 (July 1, 2019),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/%5Bdate-intz%5D/E465_3_1_EN.PDF [https://perma.cc/3MST-YLDQ].
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valid, or should it in some way be stricken from the record? This
was a consequential question not only for the victims and Nuon
Chea’s supporters (including his family and attorneys), but also for
the legacy of the ECCC generally. Of all the crimes for which Nuon
Chea was convicted, perhaps the one that would have been most
impacted if the judgment had been annulled entirely was the crime
of genocide against the Cham. Because Khieu Samphan had not
been convicted of genocide against the Cham, (a decision the
prosecution did not appeal),45 and because neither Case 001 nor
Case 2/1 addressed genocide charges, should the trial judgment in
Case 2/2 have been judicially erased, it is quite possible that the
ECCC would conclude its work with no extant convictions for the
genocide of the Cham.46
Addressing the issue of the status of the Case 2/2 trial
judgment, the Supreme Court Chamber ruled first that Nuon Chea’s
death terminated any further proceedings in his case.47 It then
ruled that the Trial Judgment was neither final as a matter of law,
nor was it wiped away by Nuon Chea’s death. Instead, it would
continue to exist in a sort of suspended animation:
The Chamber clarifies that termination of proceedings does
not vitiate that which has previously lawfully transpired.
Accordingly, the [termination of proceedings] neither
disturbed nor altered the Trial Judgement’s findings; it merely
had the effect of foreclosing the possibility of any future
proceedings by or against Nuon Chea.48

In coming to this conclusion, the Trial Chamber broke from a pair
of ICTY decisions analyzing similar circumstances, where the court
45. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, CoProsecutors’ Notice of Appeal Against the Judgement in Case 002/02 (June 21, 2019),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/%5Bdate-intz%5D/E465_2_EN.PDF [https://perma.cc/J44N-V548].
46. Other cases currently at various points at the ECCC pre-trial stage do concern
charges of genocide against the Cham, but it is not clear that they will proceed to trial.
47. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/SC,
Decision to Terminate Proceedings Against Nuon Chea, para. 1 (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/%5Bdate-intz%5D/Decision%20to%20terminate%20proceedings%20against%20Nuon%20Chea%
20ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV89-AVYQ].
48. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon, Case File/Dossier No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/SC,
Decision on Urgent Request Concerning the Impact on Appeal Proceedings of Nuon Chea’s
Death Prior to the Appeal Judgment, para. 16 (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/%5Bdate-intz%5D/F46_2_4_2_EN.PDF [https://perma.cc/7SW5-ZTZD].
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found the trial judgments to be final on the death of the accused
before appeal judgments.49
IV. INNOVATIONS IN JUSTICE
The death of Nuon Chea before the end of Case 2/2 can be
seen, at once, in two lights. On the one hand, as a cautionary tale; a
system that started too late and moved too slow, at least as regards
Nuon Chea (along with Ieng Thirith, Ieng Sary, and other Khmer
Rouge figures who died before they could face justice). On the
other hand, a tale of perseverance towards accountability; a
tenacious four-decade-long push to bring to bear justice for the
Khmer Rouge crimes, even if partial. Both narratives can be
simultaneously true.
It is absolutely preferable for justice mechanisms to be
established and move as quickly as possible while maintaining
high standards and ensuring adequate procedural protections. It is
also important to keep pushing for justice even when the likelihood
of success seems small. After all, circumstances change. Consider
the situation of Omar Al Bashir, who for many years thwarted his
arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court with
impunity.50 It was starting to seem that he might never be held to
account. But then he was deposed in a coup d’etat, and the
possibility that he will face justice for at least some of the events
that occurred while he was president, either at the International
Criminal Court or in Sudanese courts, increased substantially,
although as of this writing it is still far from assured.51
Recent years have fortunately seen the development of a
middle path for situations where full-fledged courts or trials do not
yet seem reachable. These are the investigatory missions that
gather evidence with an eye towards being prepared for trials if
and when the opportunity arises, whether that be in an
international (or internationalized) criminal tribunal, or regional
or domestic courts. The current UN-established mechanisms
encompass: the International, Impartial and Independent
Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of
49. Id. paras. 25, 29, 43.
50. Prosecutor v. Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009).
51. Omar al-Bashir: Sudan Agrees Ex-President Must Face ICC, BBC, Feb. 11, 2020.
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Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under
International Law Committee in the Syria Arab Republic Since
March 2011 (“IIIM”);52 the Independent International Fact Finding
Mission for Myanmar (“IIMM”);53 and, the United Nations
Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes
Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (“UNITAD”).54 In addition, nongovernmental organizations such as the Syria Justice and
Accountability Centre, and the Commission for International
Justice and Accountability, are performing this role.
These mechanisms reflect both the import of striving towards
accountability even when success is not assured and the import of
expediting any eventual trials. If and when courts are ready to hear
cases regarding the relevant situations, the process will
presumably be significantly shortened by the substantial amount
of evidence already having been compiled and processed with
criminal trials in mind by the mechanisms. Moreover, the
mechanisms allow for the collection of evidence that might not be
available years in the future when a trial becomes possible,
whether because a witness dies or cannot be located, or a
document is lost or destroyed, or for some other reason. The
processing of this evidence in advance also helps identify suspects
for possible prosecution. Indeed, the work of these mechanisms is
already, or will in the near future, facilitate accountability in
various fora, including the International Criminal Court, the
International Court of Justice, and domestic courts through
evidence sharing. Some observers have even called for a
permanent investigative mechanism to fill similar gaps on an
ongoing basis.55
Only time will show the full impact of these mechanisms on
promoting justice for their relevant conflicts. The judgments
52. U.N. G.A. Res., A/71/L.48, Dec. 19, 2016.
53. U.N. G.A. Res., A/HRC/RES/39/2, Adopted by the Human Rights Council on 27
September 2018, Oct. 3, 2018.
54. U.N. S.C. Res. 2379, Sept. 21, 2017.
55. See Kingsley Abbott & Saman Zia-Zarifi, Is it Time to Create a Standing
Independent Investigative Mechanism (SIIM)? Part I, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 10, 2019),
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/10/is-it-time-to-create-a-standing-independentinvestigative-mechanism-siim/ [https://perma.cc/9EEY-T59A]; Kinsely Abbott & Saman
Zia-Zarifi, Is it Time to Create a Standing Independent Investigative Mechanism (SIIM)? Part
II, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 11, 2019), http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/11/is-it-time-to-create-astanding-independent-investigative-mechanism-siim-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/RL4738TN].
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reached in Case 002 are a great stride towards accountability, but
if an investigative mechanism had been created before the ECCC
was set up, the case against Nuon Chea might have been fully
completed before his death. Nevertheless, the creation of standalone investigative mechanisms is a positive development that
bends the arc closer to justice.

